J 


GIFT  OF 


THE    CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE    SCIENCES 


BY  DE.  IBA  WOODS  HOWERTH 


Reprinted  from  the  POPULAR  SCIENCE  MONTHLY,  August,  1911. 


[Reprinted  from  THE  POPULAB  SCIENCE  MONTHLY,  August,  1911.] 


THE    CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE    SCIEXCES 

BY  DR.  IRA  WOODS  HOWERTH 

THE    UNIVERSITY    OF    CHICAGO 

THE  sciences  are  divided  by  Spencer,  Karl  Pearson  and  others  into 
two  great  groups,  the  abstract  sciences  and  the  concrete  science?. 
The  abstract  sciences  are  those  which  deal  with  the  modes  under  which 
the  phenomenal  world  is  perceived.  They  have  to  do  entirely  with  the 
"  relations  of  co-existence  and  sequence  in  their  general  or  s; 
forms."  *  Mathematics  and  logic  are  the  two  main  branches  of  this 
division  of  the  sciences. 

It  has  been  suggested  by  Comte,  and  insisted  upon  by  Proft 
Lester  F.  Ward,2  that  mathematics  and  logic  are  not  true  sciences,  but 
merely  "  forms  "  or  conditions  of  science  and  aids  to  its  stud}*.     We 
need  not  here  concern  ourselves  with  this  question.     Our  inter' 
rather  in  the  classification  of  those  sciences  which  deal  with  phenomena 
themselves  rather  than  with  the  modes  under  which  they  are  perceived, 
that  is,  the  concrete  sciences. 

The  classification  of  the  concrete  sciences  may  proceed,  of  course, 
from  any  one  of  a  number  of  bases,  as  the  chronological  order  of  their 
development,  their  logical  relationships,  the  evolution  of  their  subject 
matter,  etc.  Bacon's  classification  is  based  upon  three  assumed  faculties 
of  our  understanding — memory,  imagination  and  reason;  and  Comte's 
classification  rests  upon  the  order  in  which  the  subject  matter  of  the 
various  sciences  has  been  evolved.  The  latter  is  the  basis  of  the  c 
fication  we  are  about  to  propose. 

The  first  consideration,  then,  must  be  the  order  in  which  the  great 
natural  groups  of  phenomena  have  manifested  themselves  in  creation, 
that  is,  in  the  great  evolutionary  process. 

Evolution  has  been  described  as  that  view  of  the  universe  which 
assumes  that  a  vast,  uniform,  uninterrupted  process  of  development 
obtains  throughout  all  nature ;  and  that  all  natural  phenomena  without 
exception,  from  the  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies  and  the  fall  of  a 
rolling  stone  to  the  growth  of  plants  and  the  consciousness  of  men, 
obey  one  and  the  same  great  law  of  causation.3  Science,  to  be  sure,  has 

Spencer,  ''The  Classification  of  the  Sciences,"  " Essays, "  Vol.  III.,  p.  10. 

2  See  Ward,  "Dynamic  Sociology,"  Vol.  I.,  p.  106;  also  "Applied  Sociol- 
ogy," p.  306. 

'Haeckel,  "Freedom  in  Science  and  Teaching,"  Chap.  I.  (Humboldt  edi- 
tion, p.  10). 

263416 


1 66  THE  POPULAR  SCIENCE  MONTHLY 

not  yet  closed  up  to  the  satisfaction  of  all  the  gaps  in  this  process,  but 
its  "uninterrupted"  character  will  hardly  be  denied  by  any  one  to 
whom  this  discussion  will  be  of  interest.  We  may  assume  that  the 
principles  of  uniformity  and  continuity  in  evolution  have  been  estab- 
lished. 

Now  the  general  process  of  evolution  may  be  roughly  divided  into 
cosmic,  organic  and  social ;  and  it  will  not  be  denied  that  organic  evolu- 
tion has  succeeded  cosmic,  and  social  evolution,  organic.  There  are 
here  presented,  then,  three  great  classes  of  phenomena  in  their  genetic 
order;  and  not  only  that,  but  also  three  great  divisions  of  the  forces 
which  occasion  these  phenomena,  and  three  groups  of  sciences  of  which 
these  phenomena  are  the  subject  matter.  We  shall  now  proceed  to 
analyze  the  forces  which  produce  these  three  kinds  of  evolution. 

Cosmic,  or  inorganic,  evolution  involves  three  kinds  of  changes — 
atomic,  molecular  and  molar.  There  are  accordingly  in  this  department 
of  evolution  three  sets  of  causes.  These  causes  are  forces  to  which  we 
may  ascribe  the  names  atomic,  molecular  and  molar.  Changes  which 
take  place  in  the  organic  process  are  vital  and  mental ;  or,  as  we  prefer 
to  call  them  and  the  forces  which  give  rise  to  them,  biotic  and  psychic. 
The  biotic  forces  are  those  which  occasion  the  phenomena  of  life,  and 
the  psychic  forces  those  which  occasion  the  phenomena  of  mind. 
Finally,  the  phenomena  of  the  social  world  must  owe  their  causal  re- 
lationships to  forces  which  may  be  grouped  under  the  general  term 
social.  We  have,  then,  the  forces  of  the  phenomenal  world  analyzed 
into  the  atomic,  the  molecular,  the  molar,  the  biotic,  the  psychic,  and 
the  social  forces. 

It  is  important  to  observe  that  these  various  kinds  of  forces  are  not 
coeval,  but  have  been  successively  brought  into  existence  by  the  process 
described  by  Professor  Ward4  as  synergy.  As  a  beginning  of  the  evolu- 
tionary process,  we  may  assume  atomic  attraction  and  repulsion,  atomic 
collision,  elective  affinities — that  is,  atomic  forces,  and  atomic  forces 
only.  Other  forces  had  no  existence  in  nature  except  as  potency.  It 
seems  obvious  enough  that  there  could  be  no  molecular  forces  until 
the  molecule  was  built  up,  no  molar  forces  until  molecules  were  combined 
in  masses,  no  biotic  or  vital  forces  until  living  matter  was  brought  into 
existence,  no  psychic  forces  until  mind  appeared,  and  no  social  forces 
until  the  formation  of  the  social  group.  Thus  the  various  realms  of 
forces  here  suggested  are  coeval  and  co-extensive  with  an  equal  number 
of  great  and  well-defined  fields  of  phenomena.  No  phenomena  without 
change,  no  change  without  force.  To  these  fields  of  phenomena  we  may 
now  turn  our  attention. 

To  the  changes  of  phenomena  occasioned  by  atomic  forces  the  name 
chemical  is  applied.  Chemical  change,  so  the  books  say,  is  one  which 

4  See  Ward,  ' '  Pure  Sociology, ' '  p.  171  et  seq. 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  SCIENCES  167 

does  not  destroy  the  specific  identity  of  a  substance.  To  a  change 
which  does  destroy  this  specific  identity  we  apply  the  term  physical. 
This  is,  of  course,  a  narrow  use  of  the  term,  but  it  is  in  accordance  with 
past  usage.  Chemical  phenomena  are,  then,  the  phenomena  produced 
by  chemical  forces,  and  physical  changes  are  those  produced  by  molec- 
ular and  molar  forces.  Chemical  phenomena  are  first  in  order  of  time. 
"  In  the  beginning "  were  atoms,  atomic  forces,  atomic  changes, 
chemism. 

The  second  order  of  phenomena  are  the  physical.  They  include  the 
movements  of  molecules  and  masses  from  the  invisible  compounds  of 
atoms  to  the  great  aggregates  of  matter  in  suns  and  stars.  They  are 
the  natural  outgrowth  of  chemical  changes.  Cooperating  with  the 
chemical  forces  the  physical  produced  organic  matter,  protoplasm,  and 
thus  initiated  the  third  great  natural  group  of  phenomena,  the  bio- 
logical. Biological  phenomena,  which  are  the  manifestation  of  the 
biotic  forces,  include,  of  course,  the  whole  range  of  phenomena  between 
inorganic  nature  and  the  origination  of  mind.  Mind,  we  must  assume, 
was  also  the  creation  of  the  preexisting  forces,  and  the  manifestations  of 
mind,  or  psychic  phenomena,  constituted  the  fourth  great  division  of 
phenomena.  Finally,  beginning  with  the  origin  of  social  groups,  we 
have  the  constantly  extending  field  of  phenomena  known  as  social,  a 
direct  manifestation  of  the  social  forces. 

"We  have  now  presented  a  classification  of  forces  and  phenomena 
based  on  their  genetic  relationships.  This,  it  will  be  observed,  is  equiv- 
alent to  the  classification  of  possible  knowledge  concerning  concrete 
phenomena.  It  is  thus  a  classification  of  the  sciences.  For  a  science  is 
a  study,  or  the  classified  knowledge  resulting  from  the  study,  of  a 
definite  field  of  phenomena  occurring  in  natural  sequence  as  a  result  of 
a  particular  set  of  forces.  Our  classification  of  forces  and  of  phenomena 
in  their  genetic  order  is,  then,  in  reality  a  serial  or  genetic  classification 
of  the  subject  matter  of  the  sciences.  "  Sciences,"  says  Ward,  "  in  so 
far  as  they  can  be  grouped  at  all,  simply  represent  the  natural  groups 
of  phenomena,  and  to  determine  the  natural  order  in  which  phenomena 
are  related  to  one  another  as  indicated  by  their  respective  antecedence 
and  sequence  in  the  march  of  evolving  forces,  is  to  determine  the 
natural  order  in  which  the  sciences  stand  to  one  another."  5  The  re- 
spective fields  of  forces  and  phenomena  as  already  classified,  then,  imply 
corresponding  sciences.  There  are  five  such  fields,  namely,  chemical, 
physical,  biological,  psychological  and  sociological.  Hence  there  are  five 
great  sciences:  chemistry,  physics,  biology,  psychology  and  sociology; 
and  unless  phenomena  do  not  arise  in  the  order  stated  above,  this  is  a 
classification  of  the  sciences  which  implies  their  genetic  relationships 
and  their  relations  of  dependence.  It  is  the  order,  too,  of  increasing 

6 " Dynamic  Sociology/'  Vol.  I.,  p.  147. 


i68 


THE  POPULAR  SCIENCE  MONTHLY 


complexity.  The  phenomena  and  forces  of  each  science  appear  in  all  the 
sciences  which  succeed,  but  not  in  those  which  precede,  it  in  the  scale. 
Each  science  is  thus  engaged  in  the  study  of  a  new  set  of  forces  and 
phenomena.  The  order  of  the  sciences  here  stated  is,  therefore,  the 
order  of  increasing  complexity  and  diminishing  generality. 

The  foregoing  classifications  of  the  evolutionary  process,  forces,  phe- 
nomena and  sciences  may  be  resumed  in  the  following  table: 


Evolution 

Forces 

Phenomena 

Sciences 

Cosmic 

Atomic 
Molecular 
Molar 

Chemical 
Physical 

Chemistry 
Physics 

Organic 

Biotic 
Psychic 

Biological 
Psychological 

Biology 
Psychology 

Social 

Social 

Sociological 

Sociology 

It  is  not  necessary  to  contend  or  assert  that  the  forces  of  the  various 
fields  of  phenomena,  and  the  consequent  extent  of  the  respective  sci- 
ences are,  or  ever  can  be,  as  sharply  defined  as  the  foregoing  discussion 
might  seem  to  indicate.  The  possible  overlapping  of  the  fields  of  phe- 
nomena and  the  corresponding  sciences  should  be  indicated  in  the  table 
by  an  arrangement  of  braces  connecting  them. 

Chemistry,  physics,  biology,  psychology  and  sociology  are,  then,  the 
five  great  divisions  in  a  comprehensive  classification  of  the  sciences. 
They  are  the  five  great  stems  or  branches  out  of  which  all  the  other 
and  more  special  sciences  necessarily  develop.  There  is  no  true  science 
which  may  not  be  subsumed  under  one  or  the  other  of  these  general 
sciences. 

Let  us  now  compare  the  foregoing  classification  of  the  sciences  with 
others,  particularly  those  of  Comte  and  Spencer.  Comte's  well-known 
"hierarchy"  of  the  sciences  includes  the  following:  mathematics, 
astronomy,  physics,  chemistry,  biology  and  sociology.  Spencer  in- 
cludes in  the  concrete  sciences  astronomy,  geology,  biology,  psychology, 
sociology  and  ethics.  As  already  observed,  Comte  indicated  a  belief 
that  mathematics  is  not  a  true  science.  It  should  also  be  noticed  that 
he  gave  to  biology  a  wider  meaning  than  is  ordinarily  ascribed  to  it. 
He  included  what  he  called  "  transcendental  biology,"  by  which  we  may 
understand  cerebral  biology  or  psychology.  He  also,  in  his  later  writ- 
ings, made  ethics  the  final  term  of  the  series.  His  classification  needs 
to  be  rearranged  before  a  comparison  is  made.  This  rearrangement  has 
been  made  by  Professor  Ward  in  a  comparison  of  the  classifications  of 
Comte  and  Spencer.  For  convenience  in  comparison,  we  shall  place  the 
classification  of  Comte,  Spencer  and  the  one  proposed  in  parallel 
columns : 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  SCIENCES  169 

x 

Comte's  Classification  Spencer's  Classification              Proposed  Classification 

1.  Astronomy  1.  Astronomy  1.  Chemistry 

2.  Physics  2.  Geology  2.  Physics 

3.  Chemistry  3.  Biology  3.  Biology 

4.  Biology  4.  Psychology  4.  Psychology 

5.  Cerebral  biology  5.  Sociology  5.  Sociology 

6.  Sociology  6.  Ethics 

7.  Ethics 

It  will  be  observed  that  beginning  with  biology  all  three  classifica- 
tions are  the  same,  with  the  exception  that  Comte  and  Spencer  include 
ethics  as  a  science  coordinate  with  others  of  the  group.  If  it  properly 
belongs  there  it  must  have  a  special  field  of  phenomena  occasioned  by 
a  special  set  of  forces  coordinate  with  the  social  forces.  But  ethical 
forces  and  phenomena  are  occasioned  by  the  social  forces ;  hence  ethics, 
as  Professor  Ward  has  pointed  out,  is  only  a  department  of  sociology. 

The  chief  difference  between  the  proposed  classification  and  those 
of  Comte  and  Spencer  lies  in  the  divisions  preceding  biology.  Astron- 
omy with  both  Comte  and  Spencer  is  the  first  great  division  of  the 
sciences.  But  to  make  astronomy  the  first  of  the  sciences  in  a  genetic 
classification  is  to  imply  that  the  subject-matter  of  astronomy  is  at  the 
beginning  of  the  creative  process.  Stellar  phenomena,  however,  must 
have  been  preceded  by  both  physical  and  chemical  phenomena.  Instead 
of  being  first  and  coordinate  with  other  great  sciences  astronomy  is 
properly  a  subdivision  under  physics.  This  is  sometimes  indicated  by 
the  application  to  astronomy  of  the  names  astro-physics,  or  celestial 
physics.  Since  it  seems  that  stellar  phenomena  properly  belong  to  the 
field  of  physics  and  chemistry,  we  are  obliged  to  omit  it  from  the 
classification  as  one  of  the  great  general  sciences. 

In  Spencer's  classification  geology  is  placed  second  in  the  list.  This 
is  surely  unwarranted.  Geology,  the  study  of  the  earth,  is  no  more 
coordinate  with  chemistry,  physics,  biology,  psychology  and  sociology 
than  is  the  study  of  Venus,  Mars  or  the  moon.6  Geology,  then,  like  the 
science  of  any  other  planet,  properly  belongs  under  astronomy. 

The  remaining  and  perhaps  the  most  fundamental  difference  of  the 
proposed  classification  from  that  of  Comte  is  that  in  the  former  chem- 
istry precedes  physics.  Bacon  called  physics  the  "mother  of  the  sci- 
ences." Haeckel  also,  in  the  concluding  chapter  of  his  "Wonders  of 
Life,"  speaks  of  physics  as  the  fundamental  science.  In  the  fourth 
chapter  of  the  same  book,  he  writes  as  follows: 

The  study  of  the  atoms  and  their  affinities  and  combinations  belongs  to 
chemistry.  As  this  province  is  very  extensive  and  has  its  special  methods  of 
research,  it  is  usually  put  side  by  side  with  physics  as  of  equal  importance  j  in 
reality,  however,  it  is  only  a  branch  of  physics — chemistry  is  the  physics  of  the 


This  is  the  opinion  also  of  Professor  Ward.    See  ' l  Pure  Sociology, ' '  p.  69, 


e 

footnote. 

VOL.  LXXIX. — 12. 


170  THE  POPULAR  SCIENCE  MONTHLY 

atoms.     Hence,  when  we  speak  of  a  physico-chemical  inquiry  or  phenomenon 
we  might  justly  describe  it  briefly  as  physical  (in  the  wider  sense ).T 

But  "in  the  wider  sense"  all  natural  phenomena  are  physical. 
Thus  we  have  the  psychophysics  of  Fechner  and  Weber,  and  the  social 
physics  of  Comte  and  Quetelet.  Comte  classed  chemistry  as  one  of  the 
divisions  of  terrestrial  physics,  as  if  chemical  phenomena  were  limited 
to  the  earth !  In  our  classification  we  use  the  term  physical  in  the  nar- 
row sense,  and  the  science  of  physics  is  regarded  as  dealing  with  the 
molecular  and  molar  movements  of  matter,  that  is,  with  physical 
changes  no  matter  where  they  take  place.  These  changes  are  preceded 
in  the  evolutionary  process  by  the  phenomena  due  to  atomic  affinities 
and  combinations.  Chemistry,  therefore,  should  precede  and  not  follow 
physics  in  a  comprehensive  genetic  classification  of  the  sciences.  We 
thus  make  it  first  in  the  order  of  our  classification,  since  its  phenomena 
and  forces  are  first  in  the  order  of  time. 

It  would  be  interesting,  perhaps,  to  continue  farther  an  analysis  of 
the  sciences  in  order  to  show  where  some  of  the  more  familiar  of  the 
special  sciences  belong.  Chemistry  obviously  falls  into  the  two  divi- 
sions, inorganic  and  organic.  Physics  may  quite  as  obviously  be  divided 
into  molecular  and  molar  physics.  The  former  division  includes  such 
sciences  as  thermology,  electrology,  etc.,  while  under  the  latter,  since  it 
includes  the  study  of  all  phenomena  occasioned  by  the  gravic  forces, 
must  necessarily  fall  such  sciences  as  barology  and  astronomy,  or  at 
least  that  part  of  astronomy  known  as  astrophysics.  Geology,  the  sci- 
ence of  the  earth,  a  planet,  belongs  properly,  as  was  said  before,  under 
astronomy.  The  general  science  of  biology  is  the  synthesis  of  four  great 
special  sciences,  namely,  protistology,  phytology,  zoology  and  anthro- 
pology. Psychology  is  individual  and  social.  Finally,  sociology 
should  fall  into  the  special  sciences  of  the  respective  social  groups,  but 
the  terminology  is  wanting.  The '  special  social  sciences,  as,  for  in- 
stance, history,  politics,  political  economy,  jurisprudence,  etc.,  while 
they  properly  belong  under  sociology,  are  coordinate  so  far  as  the  re- 
spective fields  of  their  phenomena  are  concerned,  and  are  consequently, 
not  subject  to  arrangement  on  the  basis  of  their  own  genetic  relation- 
ships. 

It  would  be  difficult,  however,  if  not  impossible,  to  arrange  dia- 
grammatically  the  special  sciences  without  cumbersome  repetition, 
even  if  one  possessed  the  requisite  knowledge.  Each  branch  of  a  science 
may  be  a  contributor  to  a  special  science.  Each  division  of  biology,  for 
instance,  has  its  own  morphological  and  physiological  sciences.  An 
attempt  at  such  an  arrangement,  with  existing  scientific  nomenclature, 
would  involve  extensive  neologism. 

'Haeckel,  "The  Wonders  of  Life/'  New  York,  1905,  p.  88. 


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